From Discussion to Binding Instructions
Uniswap is one worked example, not a universal DAO rulebook. Its process documentation, last updated in April 2026, calls for at least seven days of forum discussion, followed by a five-day Snapshot temperature check. At least 10 million $UNI must vote for advancement, and an opposing majority prevents it.
That Snapshot poll signals sentiment; it does not itself instruct Uniswap’s treasury contract to transfer tokens. The Foundation’s Uniswap Unleashed forum proposal, first posted Feb. 13, 2025, links both its preliminary Snapshot poll and the subsequent onchain vote. It requested funding for Foundation grants and operations.
The binding submission came on March 11, 2025. Its onchain record registered the proposal with Governor Bravo, including a target contract and encoded transaction instructions—not merely a written spending promise.
Who can submit and vote? Uniswap’s voting guide says $UNI voting power must be delegated, either to the holder’s own address or another voter, before voting begins. Delegation assigns voting power without transferring ownership of the tokens.
The deployed Governor’s implementation requires a proposer’s delegated votes at the preceding block to exceed the proposal threshold. Contract reads checked Oct. 25, 2026 show that threshold at 1 million $UNI, a voting delay of 13,140 blocks and a voting period of 40,320 blocks. These are block counts, not guaranteed calendar durations.
Votes are weighted using delegated voting power at the proposal’s start block. Passage requires more votes for than against and at least 40 million $UNI voting for; abstentions do not satisfy that affirmative-vote quorum.
Who Actually Releases the Funds?
The proposal history records proposal 83 being queued on March 19, then executed on March 21, 2025. Winning the vote and entering the queue were distinct from releasing the tokens.
Uniswap’s active-contract reference identifies Governor Bravo at `0x408E…24C3` and the timelock at `0x1a9C…35BC`. The timelock’s deployed settings checked Oct. 25 name Governor Bravo as its administrator and impose a 172,800-second, or two-day, delay.
Anyone can trigger an eligible queued proposal through Governor Bravo. That does not give the caller discretion to choose a new recipient or amount: the Governor passes the approved instructions to the timelock. The timelock code restricts direct execution to its administrator and checks that the particular action was queued and its waiting period has elapsed.
A timelock therefore provides time before an authorized action can execute; it does not decide whether the action is sensible or harmless. Nor does waiting automatically cancel a proposal. Under this Governor’s code, the proposer can cancel before execution, and others can cancel if the proposer’s delegated votes fall below the threshold.
X100’s reported process was materially different: a Senate majority approved treasury operations within individual transactions. The Defiant’s follow-up report described a third withdrawal using the existing two-seat majority. Those reports do not establish that X100 followed Uniswap’s staged voting and timelock process.
In the Uniswap example, the final proof is concrete: the March 21 transaction records a transfer of exactly 20,320,405 $UNI from the timelock to the proposal’s designated recipient, alongside Governor Bravo’s `ProposalExecuted` event for proposal 83.
