The plan follows the DAO’s April approval of funding and product-revenue commitments under “Aave Will Win”. That framework reserved the detailed brand-governance structure for a separate proposal.
The intended holdings include the Aave trademark, primary domains, protocol codebase IP transferred to the foundation, and IP assigned under service-provider agreements. The ARFC does not name the specific domains or code repositories to be assigned. Separately, the World Intellectual Property Organization’s database lists Estonian entity Quantum Swan OÜ as the holder of a U.S. $AAVE wordmark registration.
Assignment of new code, tooling, models and documentation would become a standard condition as provider engagements are renewed or replaced. The foundation would license the Aave name back for product development at no charge.
Who Would Control the Foundation?
An independent director would manage the memberless foundation, overseen by an independent supervisor unaffiliated with that director. Aave Labs, DAO service providers and their affiliates would be barred from either role and would have no right to appoint either officer.
Through Aave Improvement Proposals, or AIPs, the DAO would appoint and remove directors after the initial appointments. It would also have consent rights over constitutional amendments, disposals of core IP, mergers and restructurings. Listings, protocol parameters, budgets and provider selection would remain with tokenholders.
For $AAVE holders, these would be governance powers rather than shares in the foundation, which would have no members or shareholders. The DAO could direct its winding-up and transfer remaining assets to a successor, subject to directors’ duties and applicable law.
Phase 1 requests reasonable incorporation, legal and appointment costs rather than a recurring budget. Any future funding would need its own governance proposal.
If the ARFC gains community consensus, the next steps are a Snapshot vote and then an onchain AIP authorizing setup fees, followed by incorporation and the initial appointments. Each later phase would require a separate proposal and vote, allowing the DAO to decline subsequent transfers or operational plans.
