Project Acacia has now tested how tokenized asset markets could settle in Australia.
The Reserve Bank of Australia and Digital Finance Cooperative Research Centre released findings from Project Acacia, a wholesale experiment that moved digital money and tokenization from policy theory into market plumbing.
The project tested 20 wholesale tokenized asset market use cases across issuance, servicing, trading, and settlement, spanning fixed income, managed funds, repos, structured products, private markets, carbon credits, and trade payables.
The key result is about money, rather than the asset wrapper. Institutions need finality, legal certainty, liquidity, and operational reliability at the same time, and the settlement asset determines whether tokenized rails can carry real volume.
Project Acacia put four candidates in the same frame: traditional RBA exchange settlement account balances, a pilot wholesale central bank digital currency, tokenized forms of commercial bank deposits, and stablecoins.
That makes Project Acacia a live case study for every institutional tokenization push. Tokenized markets only scale when the cash leg can keep pace with the asset leg without creating new settlement risk.
Project Acacia shows the cash leg is the bottleneck
A tokenized bond, repo, fund unit, or carbon credit can trade on new rails, but the market still needs a trusted way to pay for it.
If the cash leg sits outside the tokenized platform, participants need synchronization between legacy payment systems and asset ledgers. If the cash leg is issued by a bank, the market needs interoperability across banks.
If the cash leg is a stablecoin, it needs credible reserves, redemption, and licensing. If the cash leg is central bank money, the question becomes who can access it and how far the central bank wants that money to operate outside existing settlement systems.
The RBA Project Acacia final report identified potential benefits across the asset lifecycle, including shorter settlement cycles, lower counterparty risk, better capital efficiency, automated servicing, and fewer operational errors.
Those gains speak to institutional costs that retail crypto trading often hides: reconciliation, failed settlement, collateral movement, prefunding, custody controls, and legal finality.
The report also points to the limits of a technology-only thesis. Interoperability, legal and regulatory uncertainty, industry coordination, liquidity fragmentation, and liquidity tied up in pre-funded trades remain live barriers.
Tokenization may reduce some frictions, but settlement money decides whether the new system becomes a market or another set of disconnected platforms.
The RBA’s materials frame central bank money and settlement infrastructure as an anchor for tokenized wholesale asset markets, while leaving room for private digital money such as stablecoins and bank deposit tokens. That is a map of tradeoffs rather than a declaration that one form wins.
RBA Assistant Governor Brad Jones gave the key nuance in a March speech: wholesale CBDC could be helpful, but it was far from essential for tokenized markets to get started.
He pointed instead to tools such as RITS synchronization, fast payment rails, and existing central bank infrastructure as nearer-term paths.
Acacia therefore sits outside the familiar CBDC argument. The experiment shows early tokenized markets can start with existing settlement tools, while the case for wCBDC grows if those markets become systemically important or need risk-free settlement with functionality existing reserves cannot provide.
Interoperability decides whether liquidity fragments
The settlement problem is also a market-design problem.
If one platform settles in a bank deposit token, another in a stablecoin, and a third through central bank accounts, participants need a way to move between those forms at par and with predictable legal treatment.
Otherwise, liquidity splits across money silos, and each venue asks traders or institutions to pre-position funds before they know where the trade will happen.
That is why the money form changes the power structure. Central bank settlement balances preserve the role of regulated settlement-account holders. Deposit tokens extend bank money into tokenized markets but require banks to agree on standards.
Stablecoins add private competition but bring reserve, redemption, and regulatory questions. A wholesale CBDC could provide a risk-free settlement asset with programmable features, but it also puts the central bank closer to market infrastructure design.
Project Acacia’s pilot boundary is important. The trials were supported by ASIC regulatory relief, which means the activity should be treated as constrained testing, rather than broad commercial authorization for tokenized settlement.
Separately, ASIC’s 2025 stablecoin relief for distributors of an Australian stablecoin shows that stablecoin issuance, distribution, and related intermediary services remain tied to a licensing perimeter that is still being clarified.
That is the tension for policymakers. Tokenized markets need room to test live value, but settlement systems are not apps that can fail without consequence.
Once settlement money becomes part of institutional market infrastructure, questions about access, redemption, legal finality, and financial stability move from background issues to launch conditions.
The follow-on agenda shows how far Australia still has to move before any model becomes production infrastructure.
The RBA and DFCRC pointed to expanded regulator-industry coordination, possible digital financial market infrastructure sandbox work, tokenized government-bond exploration, deposit-token interoperability, consultation on settlement infrastructure and exchange settlement account access, and further applied wCBDC research.
That list is more revealing than a simple technology roadmap. Tokenized government bonds would test whether the state is willing to put a core public asset into a tokenized lifecycle.
Deposit-token interoperability would test whether banks can avoid creating separate pools of private money. ESA access work would test whether more participants can reach central bank settlement safely.
A sandbox would test how much real-world activity regulators will permit before all legal questions are settled.
What Project Acacia revealed
Australia also has a reason to separate wholesale tokenized finance from retail CBDC politics.
The RBA and Treasury previously found no clear public-interest case for issuing a retail CBDC in Australia at that time, while placing greater emphasis on wholesale digital money and tokenized-market research.
Project Acacia fits that path: the focus is market infrastructure, not a consumer cash replacement.
There is also a global context. BIS and CPMI work has framed tokenization as a question for central banks because money and assets have to move together without undermining the singleness of money.
CryptoSlate has separately covered the growth of stablecoins as a live settlement market, central-bank settlement modernization in the UK, and tokenized-stock policy questions in the US.
Project Acacia adds a more concentrated test: several settlement forms inside one institutional market stack.
Project Acacia revealed that the next fight in tokenized finance is less about whether assets can be tokenized and more about which settlement money regulators, banks, and market operators can make interoperable.
Stablecoins may be useful where always-on settlement and private-sector distribution count most, but licensing and reserve confidence remain constraints.
Deposit tokens may suit bank-led markets, but only if they do not trap liquidity inside separate bank networks. Existing central bank settlement infrastructure may support early synchronization, but access rules and operating hours still shape adoption.
Wholesale CBDC remains a stronger candidate if tokenized markets become important enough to need risk-free money with more direct programmability.
The Australian findings make a hierarchy of settlement assets look more likely than a single replacement for money. The cash leg has to be trusted enough for regulators, flexible enough for market operators, and interoperable enough that liquidity does not splinter as assets move.
The next test is which settlement model regulators allow to leave the pilot stage, under what access rules, and with enough legal certainty to support real institutional volume.
