As of Oct. 25, the linked rewrite was still marked Draft, while the main-branch Operating Manual remained at v2.0.0.
Under the proposal’s action plan, ratification would precede a Lead election, the changes would take effect with that election, and existing signers would remain until their replacements were confirmed.
A shortlist that passes unless vetoed
Under the proposed Council Appointment process, the Lead would put forward each nominee separately. Each candidate would receive one week for review, followed by one week for veto voting.
A veto reaching the threshold would prevent that candidate from being seated. The Lead would have to nominate a replacement through a new proposal, and the general appeals process would not apply. Blocking one nominee would not affect other appointments.
The Foundation presents the shift as a response to recruiting and assessment problems. It says too few candidates self-nominate, strong candidates may avoid campaigning, and delegates lack the means to conduct thorough candidate reviews and interviews.
The Lead’s assessment would become the starting point for membership. Delegates could challenge qualifications, affiliations, or conflicts during review, but candidates would not have to win an affirmative election against alternatives.
The current Operating Manual defines votable supply as OP that has been delegated so it can participate in governance.
It considers that supply active when the delegated voting power has been used within the previous six months, and snapshots voting power when a voting period begins. The 20% threshold refers to active delegated voting power.
The proposed manual also expressly exempts veto proposals from the ordinary 30% turnout quorum. The appointment’s separate 20% veto threshold would still apply.
These rules establish how opposition must be assembled, but the percentage alone cannot show whether a veto would be practically easy or difficult. That would depend on the relevant voting-power snapshot and the ability of opponents to organize during the veto week.
The proposal changes what delegates must do: they would need to identify a concern and gather sufficient voting power before the default appointment proceeds.
The Lead would face constraints before nomination
The proposed Member Selection Criteria would constrain both individual candidates and the Council’s overall composition.
At least half the participants would have to come from outside Optimism Core Development teams. No more than one participant could be directly associated with a single entity.
Association includes ownership, employment, contracting, and affiliation, extending the test beyond whether two candidates use the same employer’s name.
The geographic standard requires that the number of participants residing in any one country remain below the quorum needed for multisig action.
The Lead would confirm that a proposed appointment complied with the composition requirements, while the Foundation would privately verify geographic distribution through screening.
The Lead could not nominate a candidate associated with the Lead, or someone with whom the Lead had an undisclosed conflict. The Foundation would complete interviews and know-your-customer or know-your-business screening before posting a nomination.
Public nomination statements would include verifiable qualifications, specific conflict disclosures, and confirmation that screening was completed.
The Lead would also have to publish information about the selection process, including application and interview counts, and respond to delegate questions during review.
Those disclosures would give delegates material to review before deciding whether to organize a veto and would also hold the Lead accountable for applying published standards.
The independence requirements have a defined scope. The criteria describe Optimism customers, including OP Enterprise customers, and active contributors as showing alignment.
A Council could meet the Core Development quota while including participants with other ties to the ecosystem, subject to the association and conflict restrictions.
Tokenholders would retain a separate route to challenge the selector, and a Representative Removal proposal could remove the Lead and trigger a new election.
Under the proposed manual, that route would require the ordinary 30% quorum measured against active votable supply and 51% approval among yes-or-no votes.
Removal would therefore remain a governance process with its own voting requirements. The removal route would provide continuing accountability, while the individual veto would remain the direct way to block a particular nominee.
The appointments concern powers already in use
The Council’s charter describes a body that implements governance-approved upgrades and role changes during normal operations. It also permits defined emergency responses without a specific governance approval for each action.
The proposed charter would preserve the Lead’s exclusion from keyholding and its restriction on influencing substantive signing decisions. The appointment authority would operate through participant selection, while those participants would remain responsible for exercising their signing roles.
The deployed upgrade arrangements matter independently of that job description. L2BEAT’s current OP Mainnet assessment says both regular and emergency upgrades require approval from the Security Council and the Foundation, and that regular upgrades have no delay.
That makes council selection consequential for users even when the appointment proposal does not itself grant the Lead a key. The process determines who is nominated to participate in decisions affecting protocol contracts, within an upgrade structure that also requires Foundation approval.
An Oct. 22 interoperability announcement from the Optimism Foundation and Uniswap Labs describes preparations for an inaugural Unichain and OP Mainnet set. Its initial supported product scope would focus on native $ETH transfers, subject to technical readiness and governance approval.
The post says Upgrades 20 and 21 prepare the infrastructure but do not activate interoperability. A separate activation proposal is expected to detail shared settlement, dispute infrastructure, and an ETHLockbox, alongside contracts, timing, and incident procedures.
That future architecture would require coordination across participating chains, adding to the importance of choosing Council participants. Activation would still require separate governance approval.
The immediate decisions concern ratifying the appointment rules and the subsequent Lead election. If the changes take effect, the first nomination statements would show how the Lead applies the independence and conflict tests, while voting snapshots would establish the OP needed for a veto.
Tokenholders would retain the power to elect or remove the Lead and block individual appointments. Exercising the latter would require scrutiny and organized opposition before each nomination became final.
